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Abstract 
Four experiments tested whether self- and friend-biases in perceptual matching are 
modulated by whether stimuli are presented aligned with the participant’s body and 
seen from the same perspective (the embodied perspective). Participants associated 
three colours (blue, green, and red) with three people (self, friend, and stranger) and 
then judged if a pairing of a colour and a personal label matched. The colour was 
painted on the T-shirt of an avatar. We modulated the perspective of the avatar along 
with its alignment with the participant’s body. In Experiment 1 a single avatar 
appeared. In Experiments 2-4 there were two avatars, and we varied the social 
communicative environment between the two avatars (social vs. non-social in 
Experiments 2/4 vs. 3) and the distance between the two avatars and fixation (close, 
far, or equal in Experiment 2, 3 or 4). With a single avatar, performance on friend-
match trials selectively improved when the avatar was aligned with patient’s body and 
viewed from the participant’s (first-person) perspective. The self-bias effect was 
unaffected by the perspective/embodiment manipulation and it was strong across all 
conditions. However with two avatars performance on both self- and friend-match 
trials improved when the target stimulus appeared on the avatar adopting a first 
person perspective and aligned with the participant’s body, when two avatars were 
shown in a social-communicative context. These selective improvements disappeared 
when two avatars turned their back on one another in a non-communicative setting. 
The data indicate that self- and friend-biases in perceptual matching are modulated by 
both how strongly stimuli align with the participant’s perspective and body, and the 
social communicative situation. We suggest that self-biases can reflect an embodied 
representation of the self coded from a first-person perspectives. 
 
Keywords: self-bias; personal perspective-taking; embodiment 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
People show biased responses towards stimuli relating to themselves and 
people/groups relating to them rather than to other people. These effects are pervasive 
and modulate performance on a wide range of tasks including recall and recognition 
(Cunningham, Turk & Macrae, 2008; Moradi, Sui, Hewstone, M. & Humphreys, 
2015; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Sui & Humphreys, 2013), trait judgments 
(Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; Rogers, et al. 1997) and face discrimination (Ma & 
Han, 2010; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006). The factors that underlie these biases, however, 
remain poorly understood. In the present study we report novel data which show that 
these biases in simple perceptual matching tasks reflect an embodied, first-person 
perspective based representation, with performance being boosted by seeing stimuli 
from the perspective aligned with the participant’s body (Tsakiris, 2010;Vogeley& 
Fink, 2003).The data indicate that the biases draw on domain-specific information (an 
embodied self-representation) that qualitatively distinguishes ourselves from other 
people, but which can be applied also to people close to us (e.g., our best friend). This 
idea differs from prior work emphasizing the role of domain-general factors such as 
reward and emotion (basic behavioral drivers) in self-bias (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 
2012; Northoff & Hayes, 2011). We consider below potential candidate factors that 
could contribute to biases to ourselves and close others by contrasting prior research 
focusing on domain-general factors (e.g., attention, reward, emotion) to the current 
study focusing on domain-specific biases. 
1.1. Factors contributing to self biases 
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There is evidence that self-related information recruits attention more strongly than 
other types of information, and this leads to enhanced processing of self-related 
stimuli. For example, Sui, Liu, Mevorach, and Humphreys (2013) used a shape 
association procedure that we will exploit also in the current study. They first had 
participants associate a shape with either themselves, their best friend or a stranger. 
Subsequently they presented the shapes in hierarchical (local-global) figures and had 
participants discriminate whether the shapes at one level (e.g., the local forms) were 
either (i) the self or the stranger or (ii) the friend or the stranger. There were strong 
interference effects from the distractor level (e.g., the global shape for local targets) 
when it corresponded to the self relative to when it corresponded to the friend, 
consistent with self-related distractors automatically attracting attention. The 
behavioural effects were similar to those found when the perceptual saliency of the 
target and distractor levels is varied (e.g., by blurring to make the global shape more 
salient; see Mevorach, Shalev, Allen & Humphreys, 2009). Moreover, the neural 
structures involved in rejecting self-related distractor shapes overlapped with those 
involved in rejecting perceptually salient distractors (Sui et al., 2013), suggesting that 
self-related stimuli had enhanced salience - though this was related to their social 
significance rather than having distinctive perceptual properties. 
However even if self-related stimuli are attentionally salient, what can bring 
about this effect? One argument is that self-biases emerge due to the influence of 
some ‘domain general’ factor which can apply to any stimulus but which happens to 
be more strongly linked to the self than to other people. A candidate factor here is 
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reward, which can generally modulate the processing of many stimuli but perhaps 
particularly the self. For example, Northoff and Hayes (2011) have argued that self-
related stimuli may be intrinsically rewarding, and so such stimuli might attract 
attention through their associated reward. There is evidence that differential reward 
values can modulate attention to visual displays. For example, Anderson and Yantis 
(2012) trained stimuli with different reward values and then presented them as 
distractors in a subsequent search task. Distractors associated with high reward 
attracted attention away from targets (see also Chelazzi, Eštočinová, Calletti, Lo 
Gerfo, Sani, Della Libera, & Santandrea, 2014; Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, &Della 
Libera, 2013; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010, 2014). There is also both neural 
and behavioural evidence indicating similarities between reward and self-processing. 
For example, self-related processing is associated with the activation of cortical 
midline structures (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Schneider, Bermpohl, Heinzel, Rotte, 
Walter, Tempelmann, Wiebking, Dobrowolny, Heinze, & Northoff, 2008) which are 
also activated by reward (e.g., Izuma, Saito, &Sadato, 2008; Richards, Plate, & Ernst, 
2013; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; Sescousse, Caldú, 
Segura, & Dreher, 2013). At a behavioural level, Sui, He and Humphreys (2012) 
showed similar effects on perceptual matching from self- and reward-associations. 
Participants associated different shapes with either labels for the self, a friend or a 
stranger (see Sui et al., 2013, above) or with different reward values. After this the 
task was to decide if shape-label associations were as originally shown or re-paired. 
Matching performance was substantially better both for self- and for high-reward 
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associated stimuli, relative to stimuli associated with other people or low reward. 
Furthermore, the self- and high reward-biases both increased when the shapes were 
degraded, consistent with both affecting perceptual processing of the shapes (though 
see Enzi et al., 2008; Sui, Yankouskaya, & Humphreys, 2015). 
We may consider a factor such as reward to be  ‘domain general’, as it will 
modulate many aspects of learning and does not have any intrinsic aspect that 
specifically relates to the self. However, there may be ‘domain specific’ aspects of the 
self, that are particular to the self and not shared with other stimuli. One potential 
factor is that self-judgments recruit an embodied representation of the self that is not 
typically recruited by other stimuli. Decety and Grezes (2006) proposed that a 
domain-specific embodied representation of the self is one driver of social biases as 
well as any domain-general mechanisms (e.g., reward and emotion). Vogeley and Fink 
(2003) have similarly proposed that self-consciousness is dependent upon participants 
adopting an egocentric (first-person perspective) reference frame centered to the 
orientation of our own body. The importance of first-person perspective and 
embodiment for self-related judgments has been demonstrated in a number of 
paradigms. For example, the rubber hand illusion reflects a misattribution of body 
ownership to a rubber hand that is stimulated congruently with the participant’s own 
hand (Maister, Slater, Sanchez-Vives, &Tsakiris, 2015; Taskiris, 2010). However, the 
illusion can be abolished if the rubber hand is not aligned with a reference frame 
based on the position aligned with the participant’s own hand (Costantini & Haggard, 
2007). Vogeley and Fink (2003) also proposed that the orientation of the body reflects 
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personal perspective taking, and the first personal perspective taking refers to the 
centeredness of one’s own experiential space on one’s own body, which reflects 
bodily self-consciousness. Also judgments about whether pairs of objects would be 
used together are affected by the spatial positioning of the objects (e.g., whether a 
knife is to the right or left of a fork), but only when the stimuli are seen from a first-
person perspective and aligned with the participant’s body (Yoon, Humphreys, & 
Riddoch, 2010). Similarly, the ability of patients with visual extinction1 to be aware 
of two objects is affected by placing objects in the normal locations for action (e.g., a 
knife to the right of a fork), but primarily when the object locations are seen from a 
first-person perspective aligned with the patient’s body (Humphreys, Wulff, Yoon, & 
Riddoch, 2010). Extinction is reduced when objects are typically used together and 
seen from this reference frame. Such results suggest that embodied representations of 
the self, specifying a first-person perspective, modulate self-related judgments. 
On the other hand there is also evidence that perspectives other than our own can 
automatically be computed. Samson and colleagues (2010) had participants make 
judgments about the number of targets that could be seen either from the participant’s 
own perspective or from the perspective of an avatar present in the scene with the 
objects. They found effects of congruity (whether the avatar and the participant would 
see the same number of targets) not only on judgments made to the avatar but also on 
judgments made about the participant’s own perspective. The former result would be 
                                                             
1Patients with visual extinction are able to report a single item presented in the visual field contralateral 
to their lesion but fail to notice the same stimulus when an item appears at the same time on the 
ipsilesional side. 
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expected if the participant’s own perspective is computed automatically; however 
interference from the avatar’s perspective suggests that the other person’s perspective 
was also computed. Qureshi, Apperly and Samson (2010) extended these results by 
showing that the effects of perspective incongruity (Samson et al., 2010) increased 
when participants carried out a secondary task, but this effect was constant for the 
self- and other-perspective judgments. The data indicate that the other’s as well as the 
self perspective is computed automatically, affecting selection of whichever 
perspective is demanded for the task. There are constraints on these effects, however. 
Mattan and colleagues (Mattan et al., 2015) had participants associate particular 
avatars with the self or with another person and then examined performance when two 
avatars were present (self and other person). The task was to decide on the number of 
dots seen by one of the avatars. Mattan reported an advantage of judgement from the 
perspective of the self-associated avatar, indicating that, even if more than one 
perspective can be computed there is prioritization to the perspective associated with 
the self. Hence the circumstances under which there is dominance of a participant’s 
own, embodied first person perspective remain unclear.  
 
1.2. The present study 
In the present study we examined whether there is evidence for the involvement 
of such a domain-specific, embodied representation when participants respond to self-
related stimuli in a simple perceptual matching task and perspective information is 
irrelevant to the task. Using avatars we also manipulated the social, communicative 
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context between the stimuli, to assess if effects of an embodied, first-person 
perspective were increased when a social, communicative context is present. 
Following Sui et al. (2012) we had individuals form associations between the 
self, a friend or a stranger and a neutral visual stimulus (in this case a particular 
colour, one for each association). After this, judgments had to be made about whether 
the colour and label presented on a trial matched or were re-paired. The colours were 
presented on avatar bodies (representing the upper torso of a human form).We 
modulated whether stimuli are presented aligned with the participant’s body and seen 
from the same perspective (the embodied perspective).Three colours (blue, green, and 
red) were associated with three people (self, friend, and stranger) and participants 
judged if a pairing of a colour and a personal label matched. In Experiments 1-3, the 
label fell below fixation and the avatar’s body above. In Experiment 4, the labels were 
presented in-between the two avatars and the avatars in a pair faced one other. The 
avatar’s body was depicted either facing away (the embodied, first-person 
perspective) or facing towards participants (the third-person perspective). Even 
though the avatar was irrelevant to the perceptual matching task, we assessed if 
judgments were affected by the perspective of the avatar. In particular, were self-
related judgments enhanced if the perspective and alignment of the avatar matched 
that of the participant?  
We report four experiments. In Experiment 1 we presented a single avatar, which 
appeared in a single location above fixation (see Figure 1a). In Experiments 2 and 3 
we presented two avatars and varied the spatial location of the two avatars to create a 
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social (facing one another in Experiment 2, Figure 1b) or non-social (turning away 
from each other in Experiment 3, Figure 1c) communicative situation between the 
avatars. In Experiment 2, the avatar adopting a first-person perspective was presented 
in the location close to fixation, while the avatar adopting an embodied, third-person 
perspective was presented in the location distant to fixation. To contrast, in 
Experiment 3 the avatar with the embodied, first-person perspective fell in the 
location distant to fixation and the avatar adopting a third person perspective fell close 
to fixation. To tease apart whether the effect of the first-person embodied perspective 
in Experiments 2 and 3 reflected the distance between fixation and the avatar with an 
embodied, first-person perspective, Experiment 4 was conducted. This experiment 
was identical to Experiment 2 except that the personal label fell in between the two 
avatars, there was an equal distance between the two avatars and fixation, and the 
avatars maintained a socio-communicative context. 
 
Figure 1. The examples of stimuli used in Experiments 1-4 (a-d) (friend condition). 
What can be predicted? When two avatars are presented, two factors may 
contribute to the activation of an embodied first-person representation of the self: the 
perspective of the avatar and its alignment with the participant’s body, its location 
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(close to, equal or distant from fixation, where the participant was attending), and the 
relation between two avatars (facing each other in a socio-communicative context vs. 
facing away from each other). We propose that an embodied, first-person based self-
representation would be activated most strongly when the target colour fell on the 
avatar aligned with the participant’s body and perspective. Furthermore, this may be 
recruited most strongly with an appropriate socio-communicative context encouraging 
the coding of self- and other-perspectives (in Experiments 2 and 4). Under these 
conditions we predict that the self-advantage would increase when the self-related 
colour falls on the avatar with a first-person perspective. Experiment 4 ensured that 
any modulation of the self-advantage by re-positioning the avatars (e.g., in 
Experiment 3,where the avatars face away from one another) was not due to a 
confound based on the distance of the first- and third-person perspective avatars from 
fixation (as the embodied, first-person perspective avatar fell further from fixation in 
Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 2). In Experiment 4, by having the personal label fall in 
between the two avatars, were move any effects of distance from fixation while 
maintaining the presence of a socio-communicative context. 
The predictions for Experiment 1, when a single avatar was presented, are less 
clear. While, as we have noted above, there is evidence for an embodied first-person 
perspective mediating self-related judgments (Costantini& Haggard, 2007; Mattan, 
Quinn, Apperly, Sui, & Rotshtein, 2015; Yoon et al., 2010), there is also evidence that 
perspective coding can be flexible and not in all cases confined to a first-person 
viewpoint (Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013; Samson et al., 2010). 
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Notably, under appropriate conditions there can be automatic coding of another 
person’s perspective (Samson et al., 2010). This apparent automatic coding of the 
other’s perspective may also help participants rapidly impose their own perspective 
on that of the other person supporting judgments such as whether a stimulus is in front 
of or behind another person (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010) – an argument in line with 
the mirror neuron account of processing (Uddin, Lacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007).  
Here we assessed whether presenting stimuli from an embodied first-person 
perspective influenced self-biases in a perceptual matching task when perspective 
information was irrelevant to the task. With a single avatar, then, we predict that the 
effects of implicit first- vs. third-person perspective may be weak. One possibility was 
that an embodied self representation may be recruited in both the first- and third-
person perspective conditions (cf. Samson et al., 2010), On the other hand, even when 
researchers have found evidence for automatic coding of the other’s perspective 
(Samson et al., 2010), overall judgments remain slower and more error prone for 
judgments about the other’s relative to the participant’s own perspective, consistent 
with a default selection of a first-person reference frame. This default selection may 
particularly influence performance when a second avatar is present adopting a 
different perspective, so that stronger effects of perspective emerge when there are 
two rather than one avatar.  
What about responses to friend-related stimuli? Here there are at least three 
possibilities. One is that our representation of a close friend also incorporates 
information about a first-person perspective; we literally represent things from our 
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friend’s point of view. This would be consistent with there being representational 
overlap between ourselves and a friend (e.g., see Swann, Jetten, Gomez, Whitehouse 
& Bastian, 2012). A second is that a close friend can activate our self representation, 
which reflects an embodied first-person perspective, so that we code the ‘other’ from 
our own viewpoint, consistent with a mirror neuron account of processing (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). In both cases we predict that effects of perspective may emerge for 
friend- as well as for self-related stimuli. The third possibility is that friend-related 
stimuli do not activate representations where viewpoint is coded, in which case no 
effects of the avatar’s perspective are predicted. It is also possible that effects of 
perspective may even be stronger for the friend- than for the self, ifa strongly 
activated self representation (i.e., for self-related stimuli) can be rapidly imposed on a 
new perspective (particularly in the single avatar condition). We evaluated these 
possibilities by testing matching performance with friend- as well as self-associated 
stimuli. A condition in which a colour was associated with a stranger label served as 
the baseline. 
 
2.Experiment 1: Effects with a single avatar 
2.1. Material and method 
2.1.1.Participants. 27undergraduate and graduate students took part (15 males, ages 
18-33 years, mean age 23.41 ± 4.46 years). All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Informed consent was obtained from all individuals prior to the 
experiment according to procedures approved by a local ethics committee. 
14 
 
2.1.2. Stimuli and tasks. Three colours (blue, green, and red) were assigned to three 
people (friend, self, and stranger) and mounted on the T-shirt of an avatar. The avatar 
subtended a visual angle of5˚ × 4.28˚ it was presented above a white fixation cross 
(0.8˚ × 0.8˚) at the centre of the screen. A label ‘You’, ‘Friend’, or ‘Stranger’ 
(1.76˚/2.52˚ × 1.76˚ of visual angle) was displayed below the fixation of cross. The 
distance between fixation and both the centre of the avatar and the label was 2.9˚. An 
avatar was presented either facing the participants (third-person perspective) or with 
its back to the participants (first-person perspective). Stimuli were shown on a grey 
background (see Figure 1a). Participants were not informed about the avatars in order 
to assess the implicit effect of embodied sensory processing on biases to the self and 
other people. The task was to judge whether the colour of the avatar’s T-shirt and the 
label matched their original assignments or not (Sui et al., 2012). The experiment was 
run on a PC using E-prime 2.0.8. The stimuli were displayed on a 22-in monitor (1024 
× 768 at 100 Hz). 
2.1.3. Procedure. Participants were first instructed to associate three colours to people 
– one to the self, one to a named best friend, and one to a stranger (Sui et al., 2012). 
The particular combinations of colours and labels were counterbalanced across 
participants. For example, a participant was told that blue represents your best friend 
– Mary; you are green; and red represented a stranger. The avatar was not presented 
during the instruction. This took about 1-minute. After this participants carried out a 
colour-label matching task, where they judged whether pairings of the colour and the 
label matched or not. Each trial started with the presentation of a 500 ms central 
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fixation cross, followed by the pairing of a colour and label for 100 ms. Half the 
pairings conformed to the instruction (match trials), and the other pairs had re-
combined colours and labels (mismatch trials). The order of the combinations (which 
colour was paired with which label)on mismatch trials was counterbalanced across 
labels; for example, green (friend) was re-paired with either of two mismatched labels 
‘You’ and ‘Stranger’. The next frame was a blank with a range of 800-1200 ms (to 
capture the response). Participants were encouraged to press one of the two responses 
keys as quickly and accurately as possible within this last timeframe. Subsequently, 
written feedback (correct, incorrect, or slow!) was given in the centre of the screen for 
500 ms. Participants were also informed of their overall accuracy performance at the 
end of each blocks. There were 6 blocks of 120 trials following 12 practice trials, and 
60 trials in each condition. 
2.1.4. Data Analysis 
 Separate data analyses were conducted for the match and mismatch trials 
(organized according to the colour of the stimulus) as the different responses were 
made to these two types of stimuli. We conducted repeated-measures ANOVAs with 
two within-subject factors – association (self, friend, or stranger) and perspective 
(first- vs. third-person perspective). There was no trade-off between reaction times 
(RTs) and accuracy performance for any condition. We reported data on RTs and d 
prime respectively. We calculated the d prime as our original paper (Sui, He, & 
Humphreys, 2012) in terms of the hits (‘yes’ responses to colour-label match pairs) 
and false alarms (‘yes’ responses to colour-label mismatch pairs, based on the colour 
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assigned to the avatar), in order to calculate the sensitivity to the target colours. We 
tested if there is an enhanced sensitivity to the colour being associated with the self. 
Holm-Bonferroni corrections for α = .05 were applied to all multiple comparisons 
(Holm, 1979). 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
 RTs. A repeated-measures ANOVA for matched trials showed a significant main 
effect of association, F(2, 52) =28.83,p< .001,η2= .52, there were faster responses to 
the matched self than to the matched friend (p<.001) and stranger (p< .001) trials; 
friend-associated stimuli were also faster than stimuli associated with a 
stranger(p=.004).The main effect of perspective was also significant, F(1, 26) 
=8.49,p=.007,η2= .25due to faster responses to the first- than to the third-person 
perspective. The main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of association 
and perspective, F(2, 52) =3.22p = .048, η2 = .11(Figure 2a).Paired sample t tests for 
each type of association revealed that, compared to third-person perspective stimuli, 
first-person perspective stimuli facilitated matching responses to the friend 
association, t(26) =-3.18, p =.004. In contrast, the perspective of the avatar did not 
affect responses to either the self (t(26) =.75,p =.46) or the stranger (t(26) = -1.34, p 
=.19) association. 
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Figure 2. The mean performance of Reaction times and d prime in Experiment 1. (a) 
The RTs in match trials as a function of association (self, friend, or stranger) and 
perspective (first- vs. third-person perspective). (b) d prime as a function of 
association (self, friend, or stranger) and perspective (first- vs. third-person 
perspective). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 In order to assess how perspective modulated perceptual matching, the interaction 
of association and perspective was examined separately for the first- and third-person 
perspective trials. For the first-person perspective trials, there was a significant effect 
of association, F(2, 52) = 18.86, p< .001,η2 = .42, reflecting faster responses to the 
self (t(26) =-5.742, p< .001) and friend stimuli (t(26) = -3.322, p = .003) than to the 
stranger stimuli, along with faster responses to the self than to the friend trials (t(26) 
=3.076, p=.005). There was also a significant effect of association for third-person 
perspective stimuli, F(2, 52) = 26.96, p< .001,η2 =.50. In this case there was a self-
advantage relative to the friend (t(26) =5.9, p< .001) and stranger (t(26) = -5.918, 
p< .001) trials, but no difference between the friend and stranger trials (t(26) =-2.037, 
p =.052). 
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An ANOVA for mismatch trials failed to show any significant effects, 
F<2.15,p> .15 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of reaction times for colour-
based match and mismatch trials as a function of association (self, friend, or stranger) 
and perspective (first- vs. third-person perspective) in Experiments 1-4. 
   Association 
Experiment Match Perspective Self Friend Stranger 
Experiment 1 
Match 
First 628(61) 656(79) 683(85) 
Third 624(65) 674(76) 692(81) 
Mismatch 
First 731(72) 730 (81) 717 (79) 
Third 732 (79) 729 (84) 715 (71) 
Experiment 2 
Match 
First 624(69) 676(71) 722(76) 
Third 646(68) 694(73) 723(79) 
Mismatch 
First 743 (55) 749(60) 728 (60) 
Third 740 (59) 745 (60) 739 (65) 
Experiment 3 
Match 
First 672(78) 719(57) 748(65) 
Third 657(68) 708(59) 744(62) 
Mismatch 
First 767 (67) 765 (76) 758 (57) 
Third 774 (65) 768 (67) 752 (63) 
Experiment 4 Match 
First 457(59) 488(65) 522(70) 
Third 468(51) 497(70) 516(75) 
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Mismatch 
First 
Third 
535(74) 
537(78) 
538(70) 
533(73) 
519(77) 
525(69) 
  
 
Table 2. The mean and standard deviation (in brackets) of accuracy performance for 
colour-based match and mismatch trials as a function of association (self, friend, or 
stranger) and perspective (first- vs. third-person perspective) in Experiments 1-4. 
   Association 
Experiment Match Perspective Self Friend Stranger 
Experiment 1 
Match 
First 0.87(0.08) 0.82(0.11) 0.67(0.19) 
Third 0.86(0.09) 0.82(0.13) 0.67(0.19) 
Mismatch 
First 0.76(0.13) 0.74(0.14) 0.77(0.15) 
Third 0.75(0.15) 0.73(0.18) 0.78(0.13) 
Experiment 2 
Match 
First 0.88(0.08) 0.83(0.14) 0.73(0.15) 
Third 0.88(0.09) 0.81(0.13) 0.70(0.16) 
Mismatch 
First 0.82(0.12) 0.78(0.11) 0.80(0.13) 
Third 0.80(0.14) 0.79(0.12) 0.81(0.14) 
Experiment 3 
Match 
First 0.89(0.10) 0.80(0.20) 0.73(0.21) 
Third 0.91(0.08) 0.83(0.19) 0.72(0.21) 
Mismatch 
First 0.82(0.15) 0.81(0.15) 0.85(0.14) 
Third 0.80(0.15) 0.81(0.15) 0.85(0.13) 
Experiment 4 Match First 0.88(0.07) 0.85(0.11) 0.77(0.10) 
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Third 0.87(0.07) 0.85(0.09) 0.80(0.11) 
Mismatch 
First 
Third 
0.84(0.09) 
0.85(0.10) 
0.83(0.10) 
0.84(0.09) 
0.86(0.12) 
0.88(0.09) 
 
The results indicated that the perspective of the single avatar did not affect the self-
bias effect but it did alter the friend-biases, enhancing performance in the first-person 
compared to in the third-person perspective condition. 
 
d prime. Accuracy performance is illustrated in Table 2. d prime was computed by 
taking performance on match trials and mismatch trials where the same colour was 
presented (Sui et al., 2012). A two-way ANOVA with association and perspective 
demonstrated a significant main effect of association, F(2, 52) 
=17.90,p< .001,η2= .40; there were larger d prime values for self (t(26) =5.323, 
p< .001) and friend (t(26) = 3.928, p = .001) associations than for the stranger 
association, along with faster responses to the self than to the friend trials (t(26) = -
2.535, p=.018) (Figure 2b). This result is consistent with prior data (Sui et al., 2012). 
No significant effects of perspective and no interaction between association and 
perspective were observed (F< 0.03p>.88). d prime was not affected by the 
perspective of the avatar. 
Presenting the avatar in a first-person perspective affected the speed of making 
simple perceptual matching judgments for a colour and a label, even though the avatar 
was irrelevant to the primary task. The effect took a particular form, benefitting 
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responses to friend-related stimuli but not those to self- and stranger-related items. 
One argument is that the benefit to the friend-related stimuli arose because, with the 
single avatar, stimuli affectively close to the participant (friend-related items) 
activated a default embodied first-person perspective related representation of the self, 
which facilitated shape matching (e.g., by increasing attention to the stimuli). This did 
not take place with stimuli more distant from the self (stranger-related stimuli). A 
second possibility is that participants have a representation of close friends that is also 
coded from a first-person perspective, and this enhances response to friend-related 
stimuli. This would be consistent with the idea that there is representational overlap 
between the self and a close other (Swann et al., 2012). 
In contrast to the effects with the friend, there was no effect of perspective for 
self-related items which were responded to rapidly in all cases. It may be that the 
match for self-related items was simply too fast to enable an effect of the avatar to 
emerge. A somewhat different account is that the embodied representation of the self 
may be recruited both for first- and third-person perspective avatars, due to the 
automatic coding of both perspectives in relation to the self (Samson et al., 
2010).Alternatively, participants may hold an expectation for the self with the self-
representation being imposed irrespective of the perspective of the avatar; or at the 
lack of the effect for self-related stimuli may reflect attention being captured by the 
head of the self-related avatar when seen from an embodied, first-person 
representation (e.g., Samson et al., 2010; Senju & Johnson, 2009). This may 
subsequently disrupt the ability to match the T-shirt and label. These ideas were tested 
22 
 
further in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 2 we employed two avatars, each adopting a different perspective. 
Under these circumstances we predicted that the embodied self-representation could 
be biased to the stimulus with the first-person perspective if the two perspectives 
compete to activate the self-representation. An effect of perspective for self-related 
judgments may then emerge. Such a result would go against the idea that it is an 
expectation for the self or attention to the head of the embodied, first-person 
perspective stimulus that is critical. 
 
3. Experiment 2: Two avatars, first-person close 
 In Experiment 2 we presented participants with two avatars, one with a first-
person perspective and one with a third-person perspective. The avatar with the first-
person perspective always fell closer to fixation than the avatar adopting a third 
person perspective. 
3.1. Material and method 
 There were29college students who took part (11 males, ages 18-31 years, mean 
age 22.13 ± 3.85 years). The Method was identical to Experiment 1 except for the 
number and positions of the avatars. The T-shirt of one avatar was painted with one of 
the person-associated colours and the other with shallow grey (RGB 170, 170, 170) 
and both appeared against a dark grey background (RGB 64, 64, 64). Avatars of 5˚ × 
9˚ visual angle were presented above a white fixation cross. The distance between the 
centre of the avatar distant to fixation and the fixation cross was about 6.86˚, and the 
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distance between the center of the avatar close to fixation and the fixation cross was 
about 2.9˚.  
3.2. Results and Discussion 
RTs. The mean correct RTs and d prime results are presented in Figure 3. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA for match trials showed a significant main effect of 
association, F(2,56) = 48.73, p< .001,η2= .64; there were faster responses to the 
matched self than to the matched friend (p= .002) and stranger (p< .001) stimuli, and 
also faster responses to the matched friend than to the matched stranger associations 
(p= .001). The main effect of perspective was also significant, F(1, 28) = 16.36, 
p<.001,η2= .36; responses were faster when the target fell on an avatar adopting a 
first- relative to a third-person perspective. These main effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction of association and perspective, F(2, 56) = 5.049, p= .01,η2= .15 
(Figure 3a). Paired sample t tests for each type of association revealed that, compared 
to when the target fell on the third-person perspective avatar, falling on an avatar with 
a first-person perspective facilitated self-association trials, t(28) = -4.768, p<.001 and 
also friend-association trials (t(28) =-3.358,p = .002) whilst there was no effect on 
stranger trials (t(28) = -0.153, p = .88).  
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Figure 3. The mean performance of Reaction times and d prime in Experiment 2. (a) 
The RTs in match trials as a function of association (self, friend, or stranger) and 
perspective (first- vs. third-person perspective). (b) d prime as a function of 
association (self, friend, or stranger) and perspective (first- vs. third-person 
perspective). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 An ANOVA for mismatch trials only showed a significant main effect of 
association, F(2, 56) = 24.53, p< .001,η2= .47. There was no significant main effect of 
perspective and no interaction between association and perspective, F=0.77 and 0.57, 
p=.77 and .57, η2=.003 and .02 (Table 1). 
 The results indicated that the perspective of the avatar altered both self- and 
friend matching, enhancing performance when the target fell on the avatar adopting a 
first-person compared to a third-person perspective. 
 d prime. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the d prime data with main 
effects of association and perspective. This demonstrated a significant main effect of 
association, F(2, 56) = 18.95,p< .001,η2= .39; d prime values were larger for self 
(t(28) = 5.279, p< .001) and friend (t(28) =2.94, p =.006) associations than for the 
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stranger association, and for self relative to friend associations(t(28) = -3.535, p 
= .001) (Figure 3b). These data are consistent with prior results (Sui et al., 2012). 
Neither an effect of perspective nor an interaction between association and 
perspective was observed (F=3.171, p=.09). 
 Cross-experiment comparison. In order to test whether the presence of two 
relative to one avatar modulated the self- and friend-bias effects, we conducted an 
across-experimental analysis on RTs. There was one between-subjects factor of 
experiment (Experiment 1 vs. 2), and within-subjects factors of bias (self-bias vs. 
friend-bias, both computed relative to the stranger baseline), and perspective (first- vs. 
third-person perspective). The analysis showed a significant three-way interaction, 
F(1, 54) = 5.293, p =.025,η2 = .09. The analyses for the self-bias and friend-bias were 
then conducted respectively. For the self-bias effect there was a significant interaction 
between experiment and perspective, F(1, 54) =8.264, p =.006,η2 =.133. There was an 
enhanced self-bias in the first relative to the third person perspective in Experiment 2 
(t(28) = 3.071, p = .005), but not in Experiment 1(t(26) =-1.297, p = .206).In contrast, 
the analysis for the friend-bias showed a significant main effect of perspective, F(1, 
54) =6.249, p =.015,η2 = .10, reflecting a larger friend bias appearing in the first than 
the third person perspective condition, but neither the main effect of experiment nor 
the interaction between experiment and perspective was significant, Fs < 3.33, 
ps > .077. The data confirm that while the presence of two- relative to one avatar 
modulated the effect of perspective on self-bias, it did not modulate the friend-bias 
which showed a benefit from the first-person perspective across the two studies. 
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 The emergence of a perspective effect here for self-related stimuli makes it 
unlikely that the absence of this effect, in Experiment 1, was due simply to 
performance being at ceiling (with performance in the self-related condition being 
difficult to improve), due to an expectation for the self imposed irrespective of the 
perspective of the avatar or due to attention being attracted to another part of the body 
of the self-related avatar. The data are more consistent with the idea that, when two 
avatars are presented in a socio-communicative context, there is a default bias to 
select the embodied, first-person perspective for self-related items. This then too 
modulates performance for friend-related stimuli. 
 
4. Experiment 3: Two avatars first-person distant 
4.1. Material and method 
 There were 26 participants (15males, ages 19-30 years, mean age 22.85± 3.12 
years). The Method was identical to that in Experiment 2 except that the two avatars 
reversed their positions. Thus the avatar with the third-personal perspective was close 
to fixation and the avatar adopting a first-person perspective fell more distant from 
fixation (Figure 1c).  
4.2. Results and Discussion 
RTs. A repeated-measures ANOVA for match trials showed a significant main 
effect of association, F(2, 50) = 46.51,p< .001,η2= .65; there were faster responses to 
the self-related stimuli than to stimuli related to the friend (p< .001) and stranger 
(p< .001), and faster responses to friend- than to stranger-related stimuli 
27 
 
(p<.001).However, neither the main effect of perspective nor the interaction between 
perspective and association were significant, F(1,25)=4.072,p=.05,η2= .14; F(2,50) = 
1.063,p=.35,η2= .04(Figure 4a).  
 
Figure 4. The mean performance of Reaction times and d prime in Experiment 3. (a) 
The RTs in match trials as a function of association (self, friend, or stranger) and 
perspective (first- vs. third-person perspective). (b) d prime values as a function of 
association (self, friend, or stranger) and perspective (first- vs. third-person 
perspective). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 An ANOVA for mismatch trials only showed a significant main effect of 
association, F(2,50) = 3.438,p=.040,η2=.12; there were faster responses to the 
mismatch trials based on the self colour than to mismatch trials based on the 
stranger’s colour (p=.002). There was no difference between the mismatch self and 
friend trials (p= .043), or the friend and stranger trials (p = .095). There were no 
significant main effect of perspective and no interaction between association and 
perspective, F=3.19 and 1.59,p=.58 and.21, η2=.013 and.06 (Table 1). 
 The results indicated that there was no effect of perspective on RTs in this 
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experiment. 
 d prime. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the d prime scores with 
association and perspective are main effects. This demonstrated a significant main 
effect of association, F(2, 50) = 15.03,p<.001,η2=.38; there were larger d prime values 
for self-associations than for friend-associations (t(25) = -3.848, p= .001) and 
stranger-associations (t(25) = 5.17, p< .001). There was no difference between friend-
associations and stranger associations(t(25) = 1.359, p =.124) (Figure 4b). This 
matches prior data (Sui et al., 2012). There was no significant main effect of 
perspective and no interaction between association and perspective (F<2.6,p>.62). 
 Cross-experiment comparisons. An across-experimental analysis was conducted 
on RTs in Experiments 2 and 3, with experiment as a between-subjects factor and bias 
(self-bias vs. friend-bias, relative to the stranger baseline), and perspective (first- vs. 
third-person perspective) as within-subjects factors. There was a significant effect of 
bias, F(1, 53) = 56.7, p< .01, η2 = .51, reflecting a stronger effect of self-bias relative to 
friend-bias. There was also a significant interaction between perspective and 
experiment, F(1, 53) = 10.4, p< .001, η2 = .16, which was not qualified by an interaction 
with bias, F(1, 53) = .023, p = .881. Averaging across the self- and friend-biases there 
was an increase in the biases for first- relative to third-person perspectives in 
Experiment 2, t(28) = 3.295, p = .003, but not in Experiment 3, t(25) =-1.36, p =.19 
 Unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, there was no evidence here for the perspective of 
the avatar having any effect on performance. There remained reliable self- and friend-
biases, compared with the stranger baseline condition, but these effects were not 
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affected by perspective. Here presenting the target on an avatar adopting a first person, 
embodied perspective did not increase the biases when the avatars were placed in a non-
communicative social context. However, in Experiment 3, the avatar with the third 
person perspective fell closer to fixation then the avatar with the first-person 
perspective. Thus the lack of an effects of perspective may be due to the variation in 
distance to fixation, not whether a socio-communicative context was present. This was 
tested in Experiment 4.  
 
5. Experiment 4: Two avatars equally distant from fixation, placed in a socio-
communicative context.  
5.1. Material and method 
 There were 27 participants (13 males, ages 18-26 years, mean age 21.44 ± 2.08 
years). The Method was identical to that in Experiment 2 except that (i) there was a 
prime display showing a pair of avatars facing each other for 300 ms followed by (ii) 
the label displayed for 300 ms between the two avatars (replacing the fixation cross).  
The avatar with the first-person perspective fell below fixation and the avatar 
adopting a third-person perspective was above fixation (Figure 1d).  
5.2. Results and Discussion 
RTs. A repeated-measures ANOVA on match trials demonstrated a significant 
main effect of association, F(2, 52) = 24.55,p< .001,η2= .48; there were faster 
responses to self-related stimuli than to stimuli related to both the friend (p=.003) and 
a stranger (p< .001). In addition, faster responses were made to friend- than to 
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stranger-associated stimuli (p= .003). There was also a significant main effect of 
perspective, F(1, 26) = 4.340,p=.047,η2= .14; there were faster responses when the 
target fell on an avatar adopting a first- relative to a third-person perspective. The two 
main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of association and perspective, 
F(2, 52) = 4.678,p=.014,η2= .15.Paired sample t tests for each type of association 
revealed that, compared to when the target fell on the third-person perspective avatar, 
falling on an avatar with a first-person perspective facilitated both self-associated 
trials, t(26) = -2.61, p=.015 and friend-associated trials (t(26) = -2.17,p = .039); there 
was no significant effect on stranger trials (t(26) = 1.35, p = .19)(Figure 5a). 
 
Figure 5. The mean performance of Reaction times and d prime in Experiment 4. (a) 
The RTs in match trials as a function of association (self, friend, or stranger) and 
perspective (first- vs. third-person perspective). (b) d prime results as a function of 
association (self, friend, or stranger) and perspective (first- vs. third-person 
perspective). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 An ANOVA for mismatch trials only showed a significant main effect of 
association, F(2, 52) = 5.800,p=.005,η2=.18.Responses to the mismatch trials with the 
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self colour were faster than those to the mismatch trials involving the stranger colour 
(p=.008), responses to mismatch friend were also faster than those to mismatch 
stranger colour (p=.001), but there was no difference between the mismatched self 
and friend trials (p= 0.98). Neither the main effect of perspective nor the interaction 
between association and perspective was significant, F<0.113,p>.36 (Table 1).The 
data indicated that there was no effect of perspective taking on self-biases on 
mismatch trials. 
 d prime. An ANOVA was conducted on the d prime scores with association and 
perspective as within-subjects factors. The analysis failed to show a significant effect 
of association, F(2, 52) = 1.597,p=.212,η2= .058; neither the main effect of 
perspective nor the interaction between association and perspective was significant 
(F<.09,p>.43). 
 Cross-experiment comparisons. An across-experimental analysis was conducted 
on RTs in Experiments 2 and 4, with experiment as a between-subjects factor and bias 
(self-bias vs. friend-bias, relative to the stranger baseline), and perspective (first- vs. 
third-person perspective) as within-subjects factors. There was a significant effect of 
bias, F(1, 54) = 37.6, p< .001 η2 = .41, reflecting a stronger effect of self-bias relative 
to friend-bias. There was also no significant interaction between perspective and 
experiment, F(1, 54) = .24, p=.63.Averaging across the self- and friend-biases there 
was an increase in the biases for first- relative to third-person perspectives in 
Experiment 2, t(29) = 3.295, p =.003.The effect was also in Experiment 4, 
t(26)=3.076,p=.005. The three-way interaction with perspective, experiment and 
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experiment was not significant, F (1, 54) = .001, p = .97. 
 
5. General Discussion 
We examined the effects of embodied perspective on a simple perceptual 
matching task in which participants had to judge whether a label and a colour were as 
originally paired or re-paired. When the label related to the self there was a consistent 
advantage for matching performance compared to when the label related to a friend, 
and the friend condition was in turn facilitated relative to when there was an 
association to the label for a stranger. This result replicates prior data showing 
substantial self- and friend-biases on perceptual matching, extending the result from 
shape-label matching (e.g., Sui et al., 2012) to colour-label matching (Sui, Liu, Wang, 
& Han, 2009). This highlights the robustness of these person-related biases on 
matching. In previous studies we have shown that these biases remain when factors 
such as word length and concreteness are controlled for (Sui et al., 2012). 
 In addition to extending the evidence for the effects of personal-relations on 
perceptual matching we demonstrated that the self- and friend-biases are influenced 
by presenting the to-be-matched target stimuli on avatars that are irrelevant to the 
task. Moreover, performance was affected by whether the avatar adopted a first- or a 
third-person perspective. When two avatars were present in a socio-communicative 
context (Experiments 2 and 4), both the self- and the friend-biases were enhanced 
when the target fell on an avatar adopting an embodied, first-person perspective, even 
when the distance to fixation was equated for the different avatars (Experiment 4). 
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The effect was not due to the embodied, first-person perspective avatar being 
perceptually more salient or simpler, since there were no effects on matches in the 
stranger condition. Also the effect of embodied perspective was eliminated in 
Experiment 3 when the avatars were depicted in a non-communicate social context. 
We conclude that both self- and friend-matches were sensitive to activation of are 
presentation coded from an embodied, first-person perspective which generates 
enhanced attention to stimuli. The most parsimonious account of these results is that 
both self- and friend-related stimuli activate an embodied representation of the self 
that is coded from a first-person perspective and activated when two people are shown 
in a socio-communicative context. The activation of this representation enhances 
attention to the stimulus (see Sui, Liu, Mevorach, & Humphreys, 2013), facilitating 
matching performance. According to this account, a close friend can rapidly be linked 
to the participant’s own representation so that friend-related stimuli are ‘seen’ from 
the participant’s own viewpoint – an argument in line with the mirror neuron theory of 
social interaction (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Uddin et al., 2007). An alternative 
account is that we have a representation of a close friend that captures the friend’s 
own viewpoint, which is recruited when the avatar expresses a first-person 
perspective. In either case, the data indicate that forms of domain-specific, embodied 
representation can be rapidly recruited and influence perceptual matching. This effect 
occurs over and above effects of a domain-general factor such as the reward or 
emotion value of the stimulus, which should be present irrespective of the perspective 
of the avatar in relation to the participant’s body. 
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 When a single avatar was presented, there were effects of embodied perspective 
for the friend-related stimuli but not for self-related items. This result was unexpected. 
To account for it we propose that, with a single avatar, strongly activated embodied 
self-representations can be rapidly imposed on another viewpoint, minimizing the 
effects of perspective for self-related items. On the other hand, effects may still occur 
for friend-related stimuli if either (i) the activation of self-representations by the 
friend is insufficient to enable the representations to subsequently be imposed on 
another perspective, or (ii) friend-representations are less flexible and cannot be easily 
adjusted across different perspectives. The effect of perspective on friend stimuli was 
robust across all experiments showing any effect of perspective, confirming the 
reliability of the result. 
 Previously, authors have argued that the rapid instantiation of self-perspective to a 
new orientation can be either effortful or effortless (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010), 
depending on the information that needs to be represented. To make explicit 
judgments about whether another person can see stimuli falling on their left and right 
appears to involve an effortful mental rotation process (Surtees, Apperly & Samson, 
2013). In contrast, to judge whether another person can see something and whether it 
falls to the front or back, then an alternative perspective can be instantiated without 
demanding such effort. The latter process also develops earlier in children and can be 
present in non-human primates (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Surtees, Butterfill, & 
Apperly, 2012). We propose that this pre-reflective, non-effortful process was 
involved in responding to the single avatar when self-related stimuli were presented in 
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a first-person perspective matching the participant’s body position. Irrespective of 
this, the current data demonstrate the involvement of embodied perspective 
information even when we respond to stimuli that do not require explicit embodiment. 
 In contrast to the effects with the self and friend, stranger-related stimuli showed 
no effects of perspective. One possibility is that participants automatically identified 
the other ‘grey’ vested person as a stranger and were unaffected by the perspective of 
the other avatar. However this seems very unlikely. Participants simply had to match 
the colour with the label, and it seems most likely that they attend to the colour and 
simply made the judgement. Also in Experiment 4 two grey-vested avatars were 
initially presented and it would not be possible for participants to attend to one 
selectively as the stranger before the target colour appeared.  
There are some additional caveats though. One point is that the avatars were seen 
from a bird’s eye view, which may not fully capture the effects of perspective on 
information processing. While acknowledging that, we do note that effects of an 
embodied, first-person perspective were present throughout, which reinforces the 
argument that the effects of embodied perspective are robust. A second point is that 
the analyses of d’ across all experiments consistently showed a significant main effect 
of association, but neither the main effect of embodied perspective nor the interaction 
between personal association and perspective taking was significant. In contrast, in 
previous studies we have shown reliable effects of self-bias on d’ in tasks involving 
matching of a personal label to a shape (Sui et al., 2012). The contrast here may 
reflect a difference between the sensitivity of perceptual processing for colour and for 
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shape. In simple colour judgments (as here), there may be little room for effects of 
self- and friend-bias to modulate perceptual processing; shape perception, on the other 
hand, may be more strongly permeated by top-down effects (self- and friend-bias). 
This possibility could be explored in future studies using colours that are more 
difficult to discriminate. Do effects of self- and friend-bias then emerge on label-
colour matching? Even if the effects of self- and friend-bias on colour perception were 
weak, significant effects were present on RTs in all the experiments. These bias 
effects may have emerged at a decision stage. This issue requires further research.  
Conclusions. The present study indicates that both the self- and friend-biases on 
label-colour matching were modulated by embodied perspective; presenting targets on 
stimuli depicted from an embodied, first-person perspective enhanced the magnitude 
of self- and friend-biases compared to when stimuli were depicted from a third-person 
perspective. This was particularly the case when two individuals were shown in a 
socio-communicative context. The results indicate that self- and friend-biases are 
modulated by an embodied representation coded from a first-person perspective. 
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